My recent guest posts at Better Nation tried to rationalise the SNP's paradoxical attitude to sovereignty within the UK as compared to sovereignty in Europe. The Nationalists have historically disliked the notion of 'sterlingzone' membership and thus monetary policy and interest rates decided by the Bank of England, which they say is primarily for the benefit of the economies of London and the south east of England.
However, during most of recent history they've been committed to membership of the eurozone, with monetary policy and interest rates decided by the European Central Bank in Frankfurt and primarily for the benefit of Europe's northern nations, in particular the relatively large and successful economies of France and Germany.
My argument was that this contradiction could be explained by virtue of an ostensibly more attractive ideology and idealism associated with the European project, as compared to the tired old post-imperialist UK dominated by right-of-centre English politics, or in cruder terms perhaps just good old Anglophobia and a concomitant Europhilia.
And of course the loss of sovereignty necessitated by the SNP's aim of EU membership has always lent its 'independence in Europe' slogan an element of the ridiculous, albeit that Scotland already cedes such sovereignty via UK membership.
But the more recent eurozone crisis - and that ECB interest rates decided for the powerful German economy have kicked the likes of Ireland when it's been economically down - has concentrated SNP minds, and while current policy seems to indicate an independent Scotland retaining sterling, the long-term aim still appears to be eurozone membership.
However, last week's rescue package for the basket case Greek economy has raised the possibility of the EU deciding fiscal policies for eurozone member states. This is predicated on the basis that the public spending profligacy and accompanying borrowing by some nations - not to mentions the lack of economic convergence generally - is the reason for the whole single currency project nearly falling apart.
Indeed, even as a eurozone bystander - but with a lot at stake from a Europe-wide contagion emanating from the crisis in Greece - UK chancellor George Osborne hit the headlines last week by claiming that there was a "remorseless logic" to greater eurozone fiscal union.
In this morning's Scotsman Alf Young (eh?) looks at the implications from the perspective of the SNP Government, and points to its claim that: "With independence the Scottish Parliament would be fully responsible for fiscal policy in Scotland...Ensuring the sustainability of public expenditure would be Scotland's own responsibility, as would managing the national budget over the short and long-term."
But of course discretion in this area would necessarily be limited if an independent Scotland joined a eurozone prescribing greater fiscal convergence. Alf Young looks at the particular example of the SNP's commitment to a lower rate of corporation tax, and a nod in last week's eurozone agreement towards less national latitude in that regard: "But paragraph ten of Thursday's summit agreement notes Ireland's willingness to "participate constructively" in discussions on a draft EU directive about a common consolidated corporate tax base."
Hence if preferring the euro and interest rates set in Frankfurt to the pound and interest rates set in London seemed economically dubious, the prospect of an 'independent' Scotland's fiscal policy being decided in Europe merely adds fuel to the fire in this regard.
And as regards independence per se, if dumping the UK and sterling for the EU and the euro looked like a case of going from the sovereignty frying pan into the fire, this would surely be exacerbated if Brussels rather than London was deciding Scotland's fiscal policies as well.
Indeed, if the SNP thinks the UK economy hasn't converged sufficiently in 300 years to justify the continuation of economic union, then what chance the eurozone with its more disparate economies and its short but hugely turbulent history?