While there are those of a flag-waving persuasion who view Scottish independence as an end in itself, the majority are slightly more pragmatic, preferring politics and ideology to the 'Hampden roar' approach to the issue.
A slightly more nuanced approach, on the other hand, is represented by the "core principle" outlined in Friday's Yes Scotland campaign launch, namely: "The reason for being independent is a simple one. It is fundamentally better for all of us if decisions about Scotland’s future are taken by the people who care most about Scotland - that is by the people of Scotland."
Which per se seems unlikely to appeal to more than a minority, because if it could be forecast with reasonably certainty that an independent Scotland would end up like Greece (say), then presumably the vast majority would prefer to be under the yoke of the Eton toffs at Westminster. So why take the risk?
However, the above principle does enable Yes Scotland to encompass a wide range of political opinion, as compared to the issue of independence being associated solely with the SNP, which is very probably most people's basic perception.
To that extent, however, the 'broad kirk' approach of Yes Scotland means that many of those supporting independence are likely to be disappointed. Eddie Barnes' column in today's Scotland on Sunday expands on the movement's ideological divergence, represented by the Scottish Socialist Party's Colin Fox at one end of the Left-Right spectrum, with the Thatcherite tax-cutter Peter de Fink at the other, as mentioned here yesterday. Both clearly think that independence would promote their own particular brand of politics but, equally, both can't be right.
Of course, it's probably true to say that the main driver for support for Scotland leaving the UK is that it would presage a more Left-leaning politics, rather than questions of sovereignty and autonomy for the sake of it.
In turn that's why, as argued yesterday, to a degree the broad kirk approach blurs the picture of what independence would mean rather than clarifies it, and to that extent represents more of a threat than an opportunity to Alex Salmond and his SNP. People generally are more pragmatic about what politics can achieve compared to the more idealistic - and possibly delusional - like Messrs Harvie, Fox and de Fink.
Naturally, the less politically extreme - but nonetheless supportive of the idea of a broad-based campaign - argue that the referendum won't be about what Scotland would look like, and instead that such questions will be decided by subsequent elections to Holyrood and/or further referendums once independence has been delivered. Thus it's unnecessary to spell out the details meantime.
Again, however, this simplifies too much. Most obviously, the majority will want to see a rough idea of where Scotland would stand politically on day one. The average tax-cutter, for example, won't want a Scotland run by Tommy Sheridan, say, and vice versa.
Also, and particularly in view of the associated questions of contemporary shared/fluid national sovereignties and the SNP's consequent attempts to water down their notion of classical independence, Scotland's position vis-à-vis the rest of the world - and rUK and the EU in particular - can't just be decided unilaterally after the event.
Thus the monarchy, the currency, monetary and fiscal policy, defence, pensions, North Sea oil, national debt and Scotland's membership of supra-national organisations like the EU and NATO are significant questions that concern voters, but can't realistically all just be left for Scotland to decide alone after decision day.
One example arose on Friday's Newsnight, when the SNP's Treasury spokesman Stewart Hosie defended questions about possible Scottish representation on the Bank of England's Monetary Policy Committee on the basis that its decisions are taken by technocrats rather than politicians.
Of course, this fundamentally misses the point, which is that an rUK MPC would have no remit to take Scotland's economy into account except in the unlikely event that that's been agreed. Indeed, since the SNP formerly argued that Bank of England monetary policy was inappropriate for Scotland because it was set primarily for London and the SE of England then presumably that argument would carry even more weight if Scotland was independent but kept the pound.
Thus Mr Hosie's argument about a lack of political involvement is a red herring as regards what's good for Scotland's economy. The then Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown's argument in making the MPC independent was to take monetary policy decisions out of the hands of politicians, who could use that particular economic lever to create a short-term boom for electoral purposes but at the cost of long-term damage to the economy. Of course, Mr Hosie no doubt knows all this, but for the benefit of his Dundee SNP colleagues and others who don't, it's basically the same principle which dictates that the City Council's licensing committee is supposedly a non-political quasi-judicial body rather than something to promote the interests of the SNP's cronies in the local taxi trade.
But it's issues like that above which demonstrate that the "sine qua non" approach to separation defended by Ian Bell in yesterday's Herald and Duncan Hamilton in today's Scotland on Sunday just doesn't quite cut the mustard, at least with those of a more realistic persuasion. It's the economy [etc], stupid, and not just a question of waiting to see what will happen post-independence because it just has to be better.
(And as regards my point yesterday about the crude fallacy of Nationalist positivity v Unionist negativity, how's this for a classic portrayal of that genre from Duncan Hamilton: "Where the Yes campaign agrees on independence, the No campaign agrees on absolutely nothing other than opposing independence." No wonder he describes the Unionist position as "risible"! Of course, the reason for this self-serving and misleading juxtaposition becomes clear later in the paragraph, when Mr Hamilton opines that Unionist risibility "remains avoidable only if they embrace and champion an alternative to independence". Which surely he wouldn't point out unless he thought that full independence couldn't be won and wanted a devo-max/plus parachute?!)
But of course as well as bringing other parties and a wider array of opinions on board, the Yes Scotland concept also helps Alex Salmond and the SNP avoid the difficult questions that - as Stewart Hosie demonstrated - have been causing the first minister and his party difficulty, have made him look indecisive, inconsistent and opportunist, and has also threatened to fracture the SNP's generally united front on important policies.
Thus Yes Scotland is to an extent merely the SNP's big tent approach writ large, but unfortunately for them the more people in the tent with divergent views the more chance of dissonance and discord. Better in the tent pissing out than in perhaps, but not if those inside start pissing all over each other.
But if the intention of Yes Scotland is to neutralise some difficult questions and sweep others under the carpet until after 2014, the downside is obvious. As today's SoS leader claims: "That is, to say the least, a high-risk strategy. It revives the spectre the SNP has, until now, made much effort to exorcise: the view of independence as a leap in the dark, an invitation to Scots to vote for an uncertain future."
Thus rather than helping avoid difficult policy issues, the broad kirk could in fact bring them to the fore. Either way, the pivotal one third of undecided voters will still want to know more about the answers to the big questions before making their minds up.